Conventional wisdom says that the American-style class action will never go global. Even as some countries develop innovative ways to handle enormous cases-from Netherland's settlement-only approach to mass torts 1 to Japan's recent adoption of class actions 2 -a number of factors have slowed their growth abroad. Such barriers include: (1) bans on contingency fees, (2) "loser-pay" rules that increase the financial risk of complex litigation for plaintiffs, and (3) collective actions that, in many cases, require that all parties affirmatively "opt-in" to participate.
retirement systems, have also taken a larger leadership role in class action lawsuits themselves, relying on changes to United States securities laws in the 1990s.
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In many cases, the end result is a large fund managed by the same private administrators who commonly oversee class action settlements.
on behalf of victims.
14 Public authorities continue to play an active role in large collective actions in common law systems, like Canada and Australia, and civil law systems, like Brazil. 15 The convergence of "top down" and "bottom-up" approaches to settling large-scale problems-from the BP Oil Spill to the international response to Volkswagen's scandal over emission "defeat devices" in its cars-raises a host of new questions for the future. Is it fair for prosecutors or agencies, whose primary goals are criminal punishment or regulation, to coordinate with private attorneys who seek to compensate victims? In those countries with federal systems, how should the federal government coordinate with states or provincial authorities?
But "convergence" also presents substantial challenges for judges charged with overseeing different people and institutions, all with different state, institutional or personal interests in a final resolution. How should a judge coordinate or consolidate such cases, if at all? In a world where courts must reconcile competing interests of lawyers, victims, public investors, and local, national and multinational government bodies-each with their own private, regulatory, and criminal enforcement objectives-what level of deference does the court owe to each decisionmaker in that settlement? In short, the global convergence of public and private attorneys commencing overlapping actions creates new pressures on what countries want and expect from their courts. This article argues that as government actors assume a more prominent role in mass dispute resolution, courts will also play an important part in the deals they reach. In many countries, judges are charged with overseeing different state and individual actors involved in massive settlements. 16 And despite the variety of judicial approaches around the world, 17 in such complex cases, courts may be the only institution able to hear disparate but overlapping claims by public authorities and private parties. Courts may also be in a unique role to ensure that public and private parties effectively police one another as they take steps to reach an overarching settlement. Borrowing innovative approaches from district court judges in the United States, this article explores how countries can adopt measures designed to assist judges in coordinating massive settlements between law enforcement and a variety other interest groups.
Part I outlines the way that the United States and many other jurisdictions are converging on a governmental approach to the compensation of mass claims. The evolving response of public actors to resolve private disputes reflects two different trends. In the United States, as victims' rights advocates successfully encouraged government lawyers, agencies, and legal reformers to adopt a more "victim-centered" justice system, government actors aggressively fought for victim compensation when they settled with corporate wrongdoers. Outside the United States, reformers have pushed for greater public involvement in mass settlements for a different reason-to avoid America's infamous "litigation culture" by placing public actors at the forefront of resolving massive disputes. These converging strategies, across the globe, have 16 . HODGES, supra note 4, at 33 (charting required judicial review of 22 out of 25 European Union member states).
17. Judicial review of government actions has varied significantly around the world, as well as over the course of United States history. See created an opportunity for government officials to fashion compensation schemes for large classes of victims.
Part II highlights the conflicts presented when multiple public and private actors seek overlapping remedies in mass litigation. In many cases, government officials will confront the same problems private actors face when they manage complex cases-coordinating cases across different jurisdictions, ensuring adequate participation, overcoming conflicts of interest with victims, and distributing funds fairly. As government actors increasingly seek remedies in litigation that compensate people for widespread harm, judges will have to make difficult decisions about whom to defer to about appropriate settlement awards and proposed structural reforms.
Part III argues that this new "convergence" of public approaches to mass litigation presents a new challenge for judges. In many countries, courts may be one of the few institutions able to hear disparate, but overlapping, claims commenced by public authorities and private parties. Accordingly, Part III explores some ways that countries may adopt measures to assist judges charged with coordinating massive settlements. Borrowing from the United States experience, I suggest that courts should enjoy power to (1) conduct joint hearings involving related actions, (2) coordinate procedures to ensure fair notice and participation, and (3) review settlement agreements to ensure that government and private actors justify the difficult trade-offs they make in a global settlement.
I. GLOBAL CONVERGENCE OF PUBLIC SETTLEMENTS
Over the past decade, the United States and many foreign jurisdictions have been converging on a new role for government actors in mass litigation. Much like the emerging scholarship in regulationwhere commentators have identified that public and private actors share "regulatory space"
18 -public and private actors increasingly share The sums in such public settlements have yet to reach the totals brokered in large class actions and other private aggregate settlements, but they increasingly are becoming a substantial source of mass compensation in the United States. Over the past decade, federal agencies recovered billions on behalf of misled investors and consumers. 28 In their most recently published annual reports, the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") claimed over $4 billion in disgorgement awards for injured investors, while the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") announced over $2 billion (including a $1.2 billion judgement against a single defendant).
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The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ("CFPB") announced over $200 million in just the first six months of 2016. 30 Defenders of the CFPB frequently note that, over its short existence, it has restored "nearly $12 billion to homeowners, students, servicemen and servicewomen, car buyers, credit card holders, and other borrowers." give-students-debt-relief-that-obama-refused (observing that "[u]nder a preliminary accord, the federal government would invite tens of thousands of former students, who more than 20 years ago attended beauty and secretarial schools owned by defunct Wilfred American Education Corp., to petition the Education Department to cancel their unpaid debt"). To be fair, it is unclear whether the settlement talks reflect a change of position between presidential administrations, as this article suggests, or simply the parties' reappraisal of the strength and weaknesses of this particular case. And according to a report by BuzzFeed News, at the time this article was going to press "the Education Department said it has not approved a single fraud claim since the day of Trump's inauguration, while thousands of students already promised forgiveness are still waiting. Many have described the rapid spread of representative and aggregate procedures abroad over the past decade. 54 Representative and aggregate procedures to resolve massive disputes now exist in more than thirty-five countries. 55 Most vary considerably from the "United States model," which permits contingency fees, allows punitive damages, and precludes subsequent lawsuits to those who do not "opt-out" of the class. They also vary considerably among each other: some limit standing to public bodies or private associations the government has preapproved to commence an action. 56 But in the majority of jurisdictions, as Deborah Hensler observes, "no party has a monopoly over representative litigation," and "consumers, investors, businesses" may all pursue lawsuits on behalf of others without worrying that certain causes of action "may offend a government in power."
57 Rules may also differ over how aggregate lawsuits are financed, the level of court oversight over any potential settlement, whether parties must affirmatively opt in to the lawsuit to participate, as well as whether aggregate litigation is "trans-substantive" or, instead, limited to a few discrete areas of lawlike securities, anti-trust, or consumer fraud. But there's one form of convergence that has been less discussed. Just as the United States increasingly relies on public actors to settle with corporate wrongdoers and distribute funds like other forms of complex litigation, the same trend has been increasingly taking hold abroad. Great Britain's primary securities and antitrust regulators now enjoy formal powers to collect restitution for victims of securities and financial fraud, much like the SEC, FTC, and the CFPB. 63 In 2013, the United Kingdom announced that the new competition enforcement authority, the Competition and Markets Authority, would also enjoy this new regulatory redress power. 64 More recently, the Australian Securities and Investment Commission ("ASIC") touted its own deal to refund 216,000 bank customers $80 million "for failing to apply fee waivers, interest concessions and other benefits since 2008." 65 Similarly, public bodies, agencies, and ombudsmen in Brazil, the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, and Finland, 66 were also vested with powers to seek mass restitution. In Germany, which has relied on private associations to commence litigation on behalf of large groups of consumers since 1896, 67 public bodies now may commence large aggregate proceedings. 68 Finally, even as the European Union recommends uniform procedures to member states to respond to billion dollar cross-border disputes, like the London Interbank Offered Rate ("LIBOR") scandal, 69 it has recommended that public bodies, regulators, and prosecutors take charge of commencing actions against corporate wrongdoers on behalf of large groups of victims.
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Perhaps the reason why this kind of convergence between the United States and foreign approaches to mass litigation has received less attention is because it seems so unremarkable. Friedrich Hayek long ago recognized that civil law jurisdictions in Europe, South America, and Asia have distinguished themselves from common law jurisdictions like the United States, by relying on centralized forms of public administration to govern. 71 Unlike the United States judicial system, where judges may spontaneously develop innovative legal rules to respond to new cases and problems, many civil law jurisdictions generally accept and rely upon the expertise and perceived legitimacy of rules developed through a centralized bureaucratic state.
72 Robert Kagan also famously compared the "particularly American" reliance on lawyers and judges to regulate-what he calls "adversarial legalism"-with centralized bureaucratic approaches used around the world. 73 Because class actions allow non-state actors to assume the collective responsibility that civil law systems have traditionally reserved exclusively for the state, it perhaps should not be surprising that European systems would simultaneously increase the power of public authorities to accomplish mass compensation. 74 Nevertheless, the powers conferred on public enforcers are remarkable for at least two reasons. First, these are new formal powers that represent part of the same reform effort designed to adapt collective redress procedures from the United States. 75 77 Third, as discussed above, many reform efforts imagine that courts will play a role in overseeing the ultimate fairness of that large settlement. 78 As set forth below, the use of public actors to provide private compensation may face some of the same structural problems as private forms of mass compensation-agency costs, inefficiencies, and distributional problems. These concerns, in turn, place increasing pressure on judges who must oversee such cases.
II. OBSTACLES TO PUBLIC SETTLEMENTS
The following section highlights the conflicts presented when multiple public and private actors seek overlapping remedies in mass litigation. A vast amount of literature has been devoted to highlighting the problems of coordination, participation, fairness, and conflict in class action litigation. 79 For that reason, as countries adopt similar procedures For example, a year after private attorneys commenced class actions against the UBS alleging that it had cheated a large number of nonprofits and municipalities, state attorneys general also settled with the same defendants and created a large settlement fund for the same set of victims.
83 Private attorneys cried foul, arguing the defendants' rush to settle with government lawyers created a race to the bottom that undermined their own settlement efforts. Said one private attorney: Second, government actors may seek funds against the same insolvent defendant under conflicting standards of fairness. Some creditors entitled to receive money in a potential bankruptcy may be very different than the "victims" defined in criminal law. 85 The government may not be able to share information about how to locate assets or victims with the trustee in a parallel civil proceeding without jeopardizing a criminal investigation.
Worse yet, the dueling compensation systems may produce fights over how to distribute limited assets without any formal process for handling those disputes.
Take Bernard Madoff. After prosecutors finally exposed his decades-long ponzi-scheme, two separate funds were established to compensate his victims. One grew out of civil bankruptcy proceedings, while the other was grounded in the criminal law of restitution and forfeiture. In the first fund, "The Madoff Recovery Initiative," Irving Picard served as a SIPA trustee in a court-appointed bankruptcy, successfully collecting over $9.5 billion and distributing out $5 billion.
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In the second, prosecutors appointed Richard Breeden to oversee a multibillion dollar criminal restitution fund. 87 Breeden, however, complained that many of the beneficiaries to Picard's fund did not deserve the money. The Madoff Recovery Initiative, he noted, too often paid hedge funds and other claims traders who purchased the right to pursue their claims at a steep discount from direct victims. 88 Unlike his fund, "widows and orphans" would not get "one thin dime" from Picard's fund.
Breeden's concerns reflected the different purposes of compensation in bankruptcy, which is to orderly resolve an organization's outstanding debts, and criminal law, which narrowly defines "victims" as only those proximately hurt by crime. 88. Henriques, supra note 6. 89. Id. For these reasons, specialists in Bankruptcy worry that criminal restitution funds disrupt bankruptcy's comprehensive "priority" scheme, which commercial creditors depend upon when providing loans. As a result, commercial creditors in bankruptcy are supposed to obtain funds with the same priority as the direct victims of a fraud. Karen Gebbia, Debt and Crime: Inevitable Bedfellows the Intersection of Fraud, Bankruptcy and Asset Forfeiture, 42 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 525, 534-35 (2012) (describing the conflict between "absolute priority" scheme in bankruptcy and These competing definitions of fairness-who is a victim under civil and criminal law-also may complicate efforts to achieve a final, orderly resolution. Following a $2.6 billion government settlement with JP Morgan to compensate Madoff's victims, criminal prosecutors distributed $1.7 billion penalty themselves to their "victims," while the bankruptcy trustee, Irving Picard, received a separate settlement for $543 million.
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To this day, few rules exist to determine whether money collected by a federal prosecutor should go to a bankruptcy fund, criminal restitution fund, or both.
Third, many government actors lack experience gathering accurate information, as well as guidelines to solicit input from private claimants and victims. As a result, there have been some cases where government officers grossly miscalculate victim awards. For example, in 2010, Tom Petters was sentenced to fifty years in prison for a multi-billion dollar Ponzi scheme that wiped out savings for hundreds of his investors.
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After the district court received large numbers of objections to the prosecutor's distribution plan, the court found that the government's proposal was riddled with errors, which in some cases, lead to revisions that dropped multi-million dollar claims without any explanation. 92 Even agencies with more experience in victim compensation, like the SEC, frequently deny parties a voice in the formation of a distribution plan, limit parties' ability to intervene to challenge distributions, and overlook divergent interests in the award.
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To be sure, some private administrators appointed to oversee public restitution funds will reach out to potential stakeholders. 94 Those efforts criminal restitution). Some also observed that, because the criminal restitution fund sought to compensate so many more direct victims, it has taken much longer to distribute funds. 94. The administrator in Computer Associates, Kenneth Feinberg, highlighted his philosophy for doing so, noting that such input was necessary to gather information vital to the distribution plan: "I have a substantive challenge: What should the formula be for the distribution? But I also have a mechanical challenge of how best, in a cost-effective way, to get the money out to eligible claimants will likely improve as the SEC, FTC, and other agencies increasingly use and evaluate claim administrators with experience in private class action settlements. 95 However, no formal rules require those administrators to hear from people or involve them in a distribution plan. 96 Such oversights, in turn, can complicate the distribution process and, in some cases, add to the total cost of resolving claims.
Fourth, public actors charged with settling claims may experience their own conflicts of interests. Like private class counsel, government settlements may insufficiently account for the interests of diverse claimants.
97 Government actors may also experience their own conflicts with victims-settling quickly to avoid embarrassing headlines about oversights in their investigations, enforcement actions, or regulatory policies. Following the revelation of a series of financial scandals on Wall Street, Judge Jed S. Rakoff famously rejected a proposed multimillion dollar settlement between the SEC and Bank of America.
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Rakoff had harsh words for the agreement, pointing out that the SEC "gets to claim that it is exposing wrongdoing on the part of the Bank of America in a high-profile merger," while Bank of America acceeds to settlement as the cost of doing business. 99 Underscoring the "cynical" relationship between the public actors and the private defendant, Rakoff ("Each administrator in the pool will be evaluated annually by the Office of Distributions and, if performance is deemed in compliance with the requirements for selection, will be continued in the pool for another year, up to a total of five years, at which time a selection process for a new pool will take place.").
96. Even in criminal cases, courts may play a very limited role. For example, Petters involved a criminal conviction, where victims were able to object, and the court was authorized to review, the government's victim restitution plan. United States v. Petters, Crim. No. 08-364, 2010 WL 2291486, at *1-2 (D. Minn. June 3, 2010). However, when the government does not prosecute in exchange for a defendant's agreement to a fund, there may be no judicial review. Victims can object to "deferred prosecution agreements" in court, see 18 U.S.C. § § 3161(h)(2), 3771(a) (2012), but even there, judicial involvement is rare-and at such a late stage-victim objections may be too little and too late. Zimmerman shareholders, but also of the truth." 100 After the parties increased the size of the settlement, Rakoff ultimately held his nose and signed off on the agreement, calling the deal "half baked justice, at best." 101 Arguably, the most serious conflicts may come into play at the state level, where elected government enforcers are vulnerable to capture by the businesses they regulate, as they raise money in local elections. A series of news articles in 2014, for example, chronicled contacts between state attorneys general and the targets of potential enforcement actions that may go entirely unregulated. Some officials dropped investigations or settled actions at discounts shortly after meeting with company lawyers at fundraising events. 102 More recently, Margaret Lemos and Max Minzner detail how state and federal officers occasionally seek large monetary awards for other self-interested reasons, like when they can retain the proceeds to improve their reputations and fund future enforcement actions. 103 This kind of "eat what they kill" policy, 104 according to Lemos and Minzner, is an institutional "arrangement that is common at the state level" and has begun "to crop up in federal law" as well. 105 To be sure, the vast majority of agreements between government lawyers and businesses involve hard-working lawyers who negotiate good faith, arms-length settlements. But even in these cases, government lawyers confront an inherent conflict between their own enforcement goals and private victims who rely on them for compensation. To take one prominent example, European Union regulators brokering an historic $2.3 billion settlement arising out of the LIBOR rigging scandal lacked the same power to collect funds as British and United States regulators against major banks accused of rigging global lending rates.
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Among other things, EU regulators were only empowered to collect for antitrust violations requiring proof of a conspiracy, not the somewhat more lenient standard associated with statutory fraud. 114 The jumble of substantive and procedural rules for collective redress, in light of the LIBOR scandal has, in turn, led to calls to standardize procedures for collective redress across the EU.
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Challenges mount when foreign institutions providing mass restitution do not hear from the victims they hope to serve. Following a settlement brokered by United States diplomats, European insurance regulators and private insurers, a fund was established to resolve insurance claims for thousands of Holocaust victims called the International Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims ("ICHEIC"). In the end, ICHEIC successfully provided over $300 million to 48,000 Holocaust survivors and their families. 116 Along the way, however, ICHIEC struggled to compensate victims, just as those same plaintiffs pursued separate but related cases in the United States courts.
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One of the reasons why ICHIEC struggled was because it did not include private attorneys from the United States litigation in the design of its compensation process. This reportedly had many unfortunate consequences-delaying payouts, imposing burdensome evidentiary requirements, and generating objections from victims and their families.
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As I detail elsewhere, "[c]laim processors struggled to identify account holders . . . [relying] on rigorous evidentiary rules that often slowed down the claims handling process to a 'snail's pace.'" 119 Years after ICHEIC opened its doors, having racked up more than $40 million in expenses, ICHEIC only offered to settle 1,000 claims out of 79,000 presented. 120 Although ICHEIC hoped to save money and reduce acrimony by bypassing victim's lawyers, the decision to leave out private attorneys ironically may have slowed the compensation process, while increasing costs. 121 Perceived conflicts of interest between the government and individuals also can undermine perceived legitimacy of a public compensation fund. In the litigation following the meltdown of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, parties could obtain compensation through one of three alternative procedures: a private compensation scheme set up by the operators of the private nuclear power plant, the Tokyo Electric Power Company ("TEPCO"); an alternative dispute resolution program financed by the Japanese government; or private collective litigation. 122 In TEPCO's private process, claimants complained of endless forms, arbitrary distinctions for emotional distress awards, and a "'fox guarding the henhouse' problem in entrusting the compensation process to the party they believed to be responsible for their harms." 123 In the government process, parties claimed government-appointed mediators discounted awards by an average of 50% according to unstated guidance. The result pushed many claimants into private litigation, where they faced long delays and substantive hurdles to their class claims. 124 Even as public compensation systems hope to provide more transparent and efficient payouts than their private counterparts, in practice, they may also lead to delay, confusion and conflict.
Finally, there are times where victims abroad will possess different rights depending upon whether they receive their money from private litigation or government action. The Volkswagen emission litigation has proven to be an interesting example. According to Volkwagen's most recent financial reports, it currently faces class actions and mass actions for its "Dieselgate" in fourteen different jurisdictions outside of the United States and Canada, including: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Mexico, Poland, Portugal, South Korea, Spain, Taiwan, and the United Kingdom. 125 At the same time, a series of investigations, reviews, and lawsuits were also launched by federal regulators and forty-four state attorneys general in the United States, as well as regulators in Canada, Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom. 126 Finally, German, South Korean, and United States prosecutors aggressively pursued parallel criminal investigations, coordinating their investigations, issuing arrest warrants and, in some cases, exacting multimillion dollar fines and penalties. The variety of public and private actions against a single defendant like Volkswagon has produced complex rivalries and inconsistent outcomes for similarly situated victims around the world. After the FTC's $10 billion settlement with Volkswagen to buy back cars from American consumers, EU officials pressed to get a similar deal for European consumers.
The EU has, however, been stymied by inconsistent regulatory approaches among its member states. 128 On the private litigation front, an American law firm teamed up with a thirdparty litigation funder, MyRight.de, to obtain monetary relief for an estimated 20,000 people.
129 Because MyRight's business model takes one-third of what it can recover from plaintiffs, much like a standard contingency fee arrangement, the lawsuits only can ask for damages in individually coordinated cases. 130 Nevertheless, should the EU prevail upon Volkswagen to settle, it could use the threat of injunctive relief to get a deal that would provide Volkswagen owners with new cars. Some observe that this is a more valuable remedy that the parties could not otherwise obtain in their privately-financed actions. , http://www.bbc.com/news/business-39255554. They agreed to take "collective action" to put pressure on Volkswagen to provide compensation to million of European consumers. Id. This included "co-ordinated fines on Volkswagen for alleged breaches of consumer law," and making a joint "administrative decision," which could be used to support litigation against the company in national courts across Europe. Id.
III. DEVELOPING A JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO SETTLEMENT CONVERGENCE
Despite the variety of judicial approaches around the world, judges in common law and civil jurisdictions are placed in a unique role in mass public and private settlements. Even if the judge will not necessarily be in a position to know when a settlement is substantively fair in such cases, a judge's control over the administration of the case can shape a final settlement in important ways.
Complex litigation scholars and federal judges have long recommended that a single judge ideally should handle overlapping claims arising in massive disputes.
132
But as disputes move across jurisdictions-involving regulatory and enforcement arms of different nations-such consolidation may not be possible absent international treaties or protocols. Still, judges will require tools to review the ultimate fairness of a mass settlement, particularly where the process may (1) arise in jurisdictions subject to differences in procedure, substantive law and culture; (2) take place on parallel tracks, where public or private parties may fail to communicate with courts about another proceeding that could impact the fairness of a pending settlement; and (3) require the court to review motion practice and settlements to assure public and private actors to enter into arms-length deals.
While this Article cannot solve all of the problems that arise in mass public settlements, some of United States judicial experiments in large private and public settlements offer a way forward. Many include innovations designed to increase communication among judges and parties in mass disputes, where regulators, non-governmental organizations and private parties may otherwise fail to do so. This next part describes three potential reforms and innovations that courts may be able to observe, despite differences in judicial systems: (1) joint judicial hearings, (2) coordinated case management orders and notice procedures between regulators and parties, and (3) limited judicial review to require government actors explain the difficult trade-offs that they may make a mass settlement. In rival government and private litigation over municipal derivatives, 138 for example, plaintiffs successfully petitioned the district court to review settlement notices. Private attorneys alleged that the state attorneys general settlement asked claimants to waive their rights against the same defendants in the class action litigation they had commenced. 139 The court rejected the state attorney general's argument that the court could not interfere with their sovereign interests in defining the final settlement terms of their agreement. "In the face of these concerns," the court observed, "BoA and the Settling States respond, essentially, 'trust us. '" 140 The Court ultimately emphasized its independent obligation to "protect the integrity of the potential class and the administration of justice." 141 The court's duty to regulate communications with class members did not change just because the defendant "engaged in thirdparty negotiations with a sovereign state."
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However "pure the intentions of the Settling States maybe," a court "must ensure" notices from the multistate settlement contain "'objective, neutral information' about the nature" of the private settlement, including "the potential remedies available[] and the consequences of electing to opt out of the putative class." 148 We canvass several possible approaches to judicial review. First, judges could follow the traditional approach to adjudication, deciding the narrow questions presented by a limited number of disputing parties, on a case-by-case basis. 149 Second, judges could embrace more expansive "public law models" of adjudication, often associated with United States structural reform litigation, where a court actively manages groups of stakeholders in town hall-like proceedings to facilitate large global settlements. 150 Third, judges could tie judicial review to their "comparative institutional" competence-in each setting, carefully assessing whether courts, officials, or legislatures are better equipped to democratically hear and resolve problems among different people. 151 We conclude that, at a minimum, judicial review should exist to "alert and press" organizations-private associations of lawyers, government attorneys and public bodies-to improve the way they settle cases. 152 This kind of review would not mean substituting the parties' negotiated outcomes with what a judge thinks is best. Rather, judicial review would exist to produce: (1) more information about "the parties' competing interests in settlement," (2) greater involvement "by outside stakeholders," and (3) reasoned justifications "for the trade-offs made by the counsel on behalf of similarly situated parties." 153 In the United States, this kind of "information-forcing" approach has a long history. American courts have long responded to the growth of administrative systems, like class actions and federal agencies, by asking them to supply good reasons for the critical choices they make. 154 Since the New Deal, the United States' response to the rise of the administrative state has been to rely on lawyers-subjecting federal agencies to legal norms, evaluating their conduct according to reason, and holding them accountable through judicial review. 155 Although some commentators worry these trends impose unforeseen costs on regulation, 156 judicial review still plays an important role by improving information and analysis in modern bureaucracies. 157 Commentators have imagined a similar information-forcing role for courts that hear class actions and other forms of mass litigation, expressly drawing on courts' experience with public bureaucracies. 158 Over twenty years ago, Richard Nagareda suggested that just as courts must promote deliberation in administrative agencies, they should do so for the large private bureaucracies of attorneys who resolve class action settlements.
159 Andrew Bradt and Teddy Rave recently have taken this "information forcing" approach a step further-suggesting that courts in complex multidistrict litigation should do more than just promote the flow of information between parties. 160 They argue that courts, like learned intermediaries, can certify the quality of settlements for their beneficiaries. 161 In any event, as public and private actors provide overlapping forms of compensation, judges may be pressed to assure injured parties that the compensation they receive was the result of an informed, coordinated and fair process.
It remains to be seen how much the United States experience with public settlements will become a model for judges overseeing similarly complex cases around the world. First, judges abroad may not face the same kinds of problems or pressure because of important differences in their collective redress rules. As set out in the introduction, other jurisdictions impose substantial financial risks on private litigants who pursue class action-like remedies. For these reasons, the kinds of disputes that have surfaced between public and private actors in United States litigation may never materialize in jurisdictions that impose obstacles to private litigation.
Second, in some cases, public actors may establish claim facilities with targeted defendants entirely outside of any court-supervised process. 162 Even when a court-supervised process exists, in many countries, a separate, specialized administrative body or court may exist to review the agency's action, which may hesitate to coordinate with judges tasked with hearing private claims.
Third, in civil law jurisdictions, there is significantly less willingness for judges to experiment with judicial power or to challenge administrative determinations. 164 To the extent civil law judges already defer to other government bodies, perhaps those judges will feel less pressure to confront the challenges public settlements have presented to many United States courts.
But those differences should not be overstated. First, "informationforcing" approaches to judicial review are gaining traction, and some jurisdictions have long embraced the idea that administrative systems should give reasons and explain the tradeoffs they make. 165 Second, as discussed above, trends outside the United States are changing, particularly as civil jurisdictions manage large dockets and review more administrative actions. Finally, administrative settlement practices continue to spread. For example, shortly after the EU began settling large numbers of antitrust cases, a number of other European countries followed suit, 166 including France, Belgium, Ireland, and the United Kingdom. 167 As all of these trends converge, judges may soon confront the problems of coordination, information, and conflict only beginning to surface in public settlements in the United States.
In such cases, judges need not embrace an expansive public law model of adjudication, or even reject more classical forms of adjudication that rely on reasoned argument. But courts can, at a minimum, organize their proceedings to reduce confusion, raise concerns about conflicts between different parties with different legal entitlements, and ask those actors to explain their decisions.
IV. CONCLUSION
Judges reviewing the fairness of mass settlements brokered by private and public actors confront similar problems in all forms of government administration-alienation and capture. 168 The fear in large private representative actions is that the class representative or counsel may sell out the absent members of the class in their own self-interest. 169 An analogous fear animates large government brokered settlementsthat a government prosecutor or regulator will similarly ignore the interests of the public or potential claimants, when settling with a criminal defendant or a regulated entity. 170 In both cases, courts have been tasked with reviewing settlements to protect broader constituencies who otherwise lack the ability to directly participate in a trial or settlement that they depend upon for relief.
Although many question whether court-oversight offers a sufficient safeguard against the risks of capture, 171 there appears to be a growing movement around the world to give courts some role in the oversight of large settlements. United States judicial innovations in massive private and public cases illustrate how judges may continue to shape the deliberation, fairness and efficiency of such actions by improving dialogue between courts, parties and the public.
